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I
INTRODUCTION
Defendants' Brief is most striking not for what Defendants say, but for what
they do not say. Initially, Defendants concede that the relevant facts are undisputed
and that the application of the standard for equitable relief, including the trial court's
conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were grossly negligent, is an issue of law
reviewed for correctness by this Court. [Brief of Appellees, p.2] At the same time,
Defendants fail to provide this Court with any legal authority, from Utah or elsewhere,
that would support the trial court's conclusion that the conduct of U. S. Realty's agents
here constituted the type of culpable gross negligence justifying the forfeiture of its
valuable leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center. U. S. Realty stands to lose the
substantial improvements on the property, which U. S. Realty or its predecessors
constructed, and the future income to be realized from those interests. Defendants
have altogether failed to demonstrate why U. S. Realty's conduct should be deemed so
much more egregious than the conduct of the tenants granted equitable relief in the
cases cited in the Brief of Appellant. Nor do Defendants even attempt to supply any
authority supporting the trial court's determination that mere negligence becomes
"gross negligence" simply because U. S. Realty's agents were "professionals."
What is most striking, however, is Defendants' complete failure to confront
directly the issue of waiver. In particular, Defendants' say nothing about the trial
court's erroneous determination that Defendants cannot be deemed to have waived the

requirement for timely notice because they never bothered to read the Lease
Agreements (even when they received U. S. Realty's notices exercising the options to
renew) and, therefore, did not "intentionally" relinquish their right to such notice.
Rather, Defendants choose to discuss the issue of waiver largely in passing, by taking
various statements made by this Court in Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah
1998), out of context and asserting that there can be no waiver because Defendants'
actions did not cause U. S. Realty to provide late notice.
In fact, however, Geisdorf, upon which Defendants so heavily rely, virtually
mandates reversal of the trial court's refusal to find waiver. In particular, this Court in
Geisdorf squarely stated, in the context of its discussion of waiver, that "each party has
the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes his or
her signature to it," and that a "party may not sign a contract and thereafter assert
ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense." 972 P.2d at 73 (quoting John
Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1987). The reference
to "each party," of course, decisively disposes of the trial court's primary basis for
refusing to find waiver — the admitted failure of Defendants to acquaint themselves
with the terms of the Lease Agreement.
The necessary rejection of this argument leaves nothing, in Defendants' Brief or
in the trial court's opinion, that would provide any basis for failing to find waiver.
This is not a case like I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah
454 (1907), in which the Court refused to find waiver based solely upon alleged
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conversations in which the tenant advised the landlord of a "mere intention to make a
request" to renew. 32 Utah at 466 (quoted in Appellees' Brief, at p. 15). Rather, this
is a case in which U.S. Realty exercised the option to renew in writing, albeit past the
date set forth in the Lease Agreement. Defendants, after receiving such written notice,
acted in a manner that clearly, conclusively and unambiguously manifested their
acceptance of the renewal by: (1) entering into an Agreement with U. S. Realty,
subsequent to the notices of April 17, 1998, by which U. S. Realty agreed to forego any
rights to the condemnation proceeds in exchange for ground rent reductions during the
option periods; (2) requesting Mark Hoffman to contact their attorney, Mr. George
Fadel, to have the necessary paperwork prepared to memorialize the settlement of the
condemnation action; (3) requesting and accepting payment from U. S. Realty for
sewer assessments that extended into the option period, and would only be due if the
option had been exercised; and (4) requesting and accepting payment from U. S. Realty
for the slope easement which, again, related to the option period and would only be due
if the option had been exercised.
U. S. Realty must also prevail on its claim for equitable relief. Defendants do
not argue that U. S. Realty must be denied equitable relief under the legion of cases
throughout the nation that have recognized such a right. Instead, Defendants argue that
this Court should refuse to recognize such a claim at all on the basis of Geisdorf and
Berets, even though neither case stands for that proposition, and even though Geisdorf
clearly indicates that Utah law is to the contrary.
-3-

With respect to the issue of "gross negligence," Defendants supply no legal
authority whatsoever, but simply argue that U. S. Realty's agents were "grossly
negligent" because U. S. Realty had received correspondence from representatives of
the Utah Department of Transportation referencing the expiration of the initial terms of
the Ground Leases and, moreover, because they knew that U. S. Realty's tenant, KMart, had to provide a written notice to U. S. Realty of K-Mart's exercise of its own
option. U. S. Realty's agents, however, fully explained the reasons why these events
did not lead them to immediately review the renewal provisions of the Ground Leases
in light of the Lease Abstract system, which they had every reason to believe would
provide them with sufficient notice of any necessary dates. Defendants have failed to
provide any legal authority suggesting that circumstances such as these, or anything
even remotely analogous to circumstances such as these, would elevate "mere neglect,"
as to which equitable relief would be available, to "gross negligence," justifying the
punitive result of forfeiture.
The focus of claims for equitable relief must simply be whether the "forfeiture"
and the "gravity of the loss" would be "out of all proportion to the gravity of the fault."
J.N.A. Realty Corp v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313,1317-18 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1977). Where, as here, the Defendants not only suffered no prejudice or harm
from the late exercise of the option to renew but, by their own admission, did not even
pay attention to the exercise and simply proceeded forward in a manner that recognized
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that the option had validly been exercised, this question virtually answers itself. The
Judgment of the trial court must, therefore, be reversed.
II
ARGUMENT
A.

T H E TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND WAIVER IN THE FACE OF UNDISPUTED
FACTS ESTABLISHING A MANIFEST AND DISTINCT INTENT ON DEFENDANTS'
PART TO DISPENSE WITH THE TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR NOTICE UNDER THE
LEASES CONSTITUTES CLEAR ERROR.

Defendants cannot dispute that this Court, in Geisdorf, acknowledged that strict
compliance with the terms of a renewal option can be waived by a landlord and,
moreover, that the waiver can be implied from conduct manifesting such an intent.
Nor do Defendants offer any conceivable basis upon which a Court could reasonably
find that their conduct, including what the trial court found was an agreement reached
subsequent to receipt of the April 17, 1998, renewal notices, providing for a reduction
in rent during the option period, was anything other than a clear and unambiguous
manifestation of an intent to accept those delayed notices.
Nevertheless, Defendants state, in perfunctory fashion, that their "silence" does
not demonstrate implied waiver, nor does the "discussions of rent reduction during the
option periods," citing the trial court's statement that the negotiations between the
parties "is not what caused plaintiff to fail to provide timely notice."

[Brief of

Appellees, pp. 9-11]. Defendants also cite Geisdorf for the proposition that "mere
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak," Id. at p. 12,
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and cite Berets for the proposition that waiver cannot be established by the landlord's
knowledge of the tenant's "mere intention to make a request." Id. at p. 15. Other than
these conclusory statements and out-of-context quotations, Defendants offer no further
justification for the trial court's rejection of waiver, other than to rely upon the trial
court's analysis. This analysis was entirely based on the erroneous legal theory that
because Defendants never read the Lease Agreements, and because they paid no
attention whatsoever to the notices of renewal when they were received, they cannot be
deemed to have "intentionally" waived their right to receive notices that they did not
care about. Id. at 32.
Initially, the argument that Defendants' conduct was not the cause of U. S.
Realty's late exercise of notice is legally irrelevant. Although the doctrine of estoppel
requires detrimental reliance, the doctrine of waiver does not. See, e. g.f Braugh v.
Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (waiver of a contractual right
may be effective after the time for performance if condition waived is not material part
of agreed exchange of performance and non-performance does not materially affect
value received); Old Mill Printers v. Kruse, 392 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
("a condition of notice can be eliminated by a voluntary waiver of the promisor, either
before or after the time the notice is due"). Certainly, this Court in Geisdorf did not
suggest that waiver can only be found if it is the cause of a tenant's failure to strictly
comply with an option, stating simply that waiver requires only that there be an
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence and an intention to
-6-

relinquish it. 972 P.2d at 72 (quoting Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)). As this Court also made clear, conduct
evidencing a "distinct intent to waive the written notice requirement" will give rise to a
finding of waiver. Id 972 P.2d at 73-74.
In this case there is no need to find an intent to waiver the written notice
requirement entirely, but rather, simply to find an intent to waive the specific time
requirements for the giving of such written notice. Written notice was in fact given
and duly received by Defendants more than three months prior to the expiration of the
initial 25-year terms of the Ground Leases. After receiving these notices, Defendants
were not merely silent, but took affirmative actions, including the reaching of
agreements with U. S. Realty and the request for and acceptance of payments from U.
S. Realty relating to the option periods, which cannot be reconciled with any intent
other than an acceptance of the untimely exercise of the option.
This leaves, then, only the trial court's finding that Defendants did not waive
the right to timely notice because they did not read the Ground Leases and, therefore,
did not "know" that they had the right to receive timely notice. This argument is
conclusively disposed of by this Court's observations in Geisdorf that "each party has
the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes his or
her signature to it," and that a party "may not sign a contract and thereafter assert
ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense." 972 P.2d at 73. Nothing in
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Geisdorf indicates that this obligation is unilateral, to be visited solely upon a tenant,
but not upon a landlord.
Indeed, the precise reasoning of the trial court, endorsed by Defendants in their
Brief, was considered and rejected in Adam v. Consoling 135 Conn. 321, 64 A.2d 44
(S. Ct. Errors 1949), where the tenant tendered payment in advance for the first three
months of the extended Lease term, which was received by the landlord and accepted
in the absence of the tenant's written notice to extend in accordance with the terms of
the Lease. Like the Defendants here, the landlords argued that "there was no evidence
that they knew the expiration date of the lease at the time they accepted the check."
135 Conn, at 324, 64 A.2d at 45. The Court rejected this argument in words equally
applicable here:
In the absence of other facts [landlord] cannot take the position
that they had not read the lease or, having read it, had forgotten
its provisions. The law conclusively imputes to ["landlord"!,
when she had the conversation with the plaintiff, knowledge of
the terms of the lease. . . . This is a 'most wholesome and
necessary rule, . . . otherwise it would lay open to a party to a
contract entirely too wide a field for a denial of knowledge,
which would in many cases be impossible. The finding cannot
be corrected. The requirement of a written notice of the
exercise of the option was for the benefit of the lessors and
could be waived by them orally or by conduct."
Id. at 324, 64 A.2d at 45-46 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
In short, if U. S. Realty is charged with knowledge of the terms of the Ground
Leases, so are the Defendants, and the trial court's refusal to find waiver cannot be
sustained.
-8-

B.

T H E TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT U. S. REALTY'S AGENTS WERE
GROSSLY NEGLIGENT CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR BASED ON THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS.

1.

Applicable Legal Standard.

Perceiving the weakness in their argument that U. S. Realty's agents were
grossly negligent, Defendants now claim that the appropriate legal standard
nonetheless precludes equitable relief where the requesting party was merely negligent
or guilty of inadvertent oversight.

The trial court rejected these same arguments,

concluding that the Utah Supreme Court in Geisdorf implicitly adopted a standard that
provides for equitable relief even if a party has been negligent, but not grossly
negligent. [Memorandum Decision, p. 7-8] Defendants' argument to the contrary
lacks substantive merit.
As described in Appellant's Brief, the over-whelming majority of jurisdictions
having confronted requests for equitable relief have granted it where a tenant has been
negligent or acted inadvertently in failing to provide timely notice of its exercise of a
lease option, and the tenant meets the other requirements for such relief. [Brief of
Appellant, p. 20-24] Neither Geisdorf, Berets nor any other authorities compel a
contrary standard or result under Utah law.
This Court was clear in Geisdorf that it was accepting the majority rule:
There are instances in which deviation from strict compliance
may be equitably excused. . . . Some instances in which an
optionee may be excused from strict compliance include when
the optionee's conduct in failing to comply was not due to
willful or gross negligence on the part of the optionee but was
-9-

rather the result of an honest and justifiable mistake,' Cattle
Feeders, Inc. v. Jordan, 549 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977)..." 972P.2dat71.
Although Defendants dismiss this clear statement as "obiter dicta" [Brief of
Appellees, p. 10], it is respectfully submitted that this Court should be regarded as
having meant what it said in Geisdorf. It is also clear from the reference to Cattle
Feeders, that this Court accepted the basic premise of that case, and the numerous
cases from other jurisdictions which have similarly held that negligence which was not
"willful or gross" could form a basis for granting equitable relief.
Cattle Feeders itself relied upon Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W. 2d 265 (Tex. App.
1939), as establishing the standard for equitable relief adopted in Texas. The Jones
court, in turn, expressly adopted the standard established earlier in F. B. Fountain Co.
v. Stein, 118 A. 47, 50 (Conn. 1922), which clearly allows equitable relief to be
granted under circumstances constituting inadvertence or mere negligence. [Brief of
Appellant, pp. 20-25] "The gist of [F. B. Fountain] is that it would be unconscionable
to enforce literally the condition for the extension when to do so would cause the
lessee, who had not been grossly negligent, to lose the value of the improvements and
the goodwill of the established business." Jones, 130 S.W. 2d at 272 [emphasis
added].

By citing Cattle Feeders, including its reference to "willful or gross

negligence," the Geisdorf Court surely must have intended to adopt the standard for
equitable relief followed in that jurisdiction, and must not have intended to limit
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equitable relief to situations involving honest and justifiable mistake, misrepresentation
or waiver, as suggested by Defendants.
Defendants' argument that Berets precludes equitable relief in cases of mere
neglect is also unavailing for at least two reasons. First, Berets does not provide a
meaningful discussion or analysis of the standard for granting equitable relief under the
circumstances at issue in this case, although the opinion does recognize the availability
of equitable relief: "Courts have no right to disregard any provision of a contract, or to
save rights that are lost thereunder through the act of the party asking for relief, unless
it is made to appear that it would be unconscionable or clearly inequitable to do or not
to do so." 91 P. at 283 [emphasis added]. Although the Court in Berets was not
compelled by the plaintiffs explanation of inadvertent failure to provide timely notice,
the Court certainly did not make the broad pronouncement that inadvertence or mere
negligence bars equitable relief as a matter of law in all cases.
As support for their broad interpretation of Berets, Defendants cite only one
Nevada case, Host Intern. Inc. v. Summa Corp., 583 P.2d 1080 (Nev. 1978). The
Nevada Court's two paragraph per curium opinion concludes that equity does not
protect a lessee from its own negligent failure to provide the required notice to exercise
a lease renewal option, citing Berets as authority for this proposition. As discussed
above, this conclusion overstates the holding in Berets, and is inconsistent with the
Nevada Court's own prior pronouncements on the subject. In Benetti v. Kishner, 558
P.2d 537 (Nev. 1977), a case cited in Host, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed a
-11-

summary judgment in the landlord's favor, recognizing that "special circumstances
may warrant equitable relief and thus preclude forfeiture of the tenant's right to
renew." Id. at 538. The Court found that the tenant's excuse for his tardy notice of
renewal, a belief that such notice was not necessary based on an apparently mistaken
view of an Addendum to the Lease, created an issue of fact which required a trial. Id.
at 538-39. This excuse could be construed as mere negligence or inadvertence. If
equitable relief was unavailable in Nevada as a matter of law due to the tenant's mere
negligence or inadvertence, remand would have been unnecessary.
The second reason Berets cannot be read so broadly is that the opinion is now
almost 100 years' old, and the case law dealing specifically with claims for equitable
relief under these circumstances is now substantially more developed, as described in
the Brief of Appellant, Section VI.A(l). It is also curious that Berets was not cited in
Geisdorf in its discussion of equitable relief, particularly if Defendants' broad reading
of Berets is correct. If the Court desired to adopt the standard proposed by defendants,
which would be at odds with the vast majority of jurisdictions, including Texas, the
Court surely would have expressly so stated, citing Berets as precedent instead of
Cattle Feeders.
Finally, Defendants' effort to analogize equitable relief standards relating to
statutes of limitations and fraud cases to the present facts is unavailing. Courts around
the country have developed a specific legal standard for equitable relief in option
renewal cases. This comprehensive line of cases is more compelling in establishing a
-12-

legal framework for analyzing the present facts than authority dealing with
distinguishable facts and inapplicable legal theories.
In light of the above, Defendants' challenges to the legal standard adopted by
the trial court are without merit, and U. S. Realty is not barred from equitable relief due
to negligence or inadvertence.
2.

The Evidence.

The trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents, Mark Hoffman and Phil
Shiffman, were grossly negligent revolves around the fact that neither Hoffman nor
Shiffman specifically reviewed the Ground Leases after they took over management in
October 1995, to determine how to exercise the renewal options. Instead, Hoffman
relied upon Shiffman to alert him to any deadlines based on Lease Abstracts obtained
from the prior management company. The deficiency of the Lease Abstracts in this
particular regard was not discovered until Mark Hoffman reviewed the Leases on April
17, 1998, after the time to provide notice had already passed.

Gross negligence

occurred, in the trial court's view, because Hoffman and Shiffman relied upon Lease
Abstracts without further confirmation. This Court must determine whether the trial
court's conclusion that such conduct constitutes gross negligence is correct.
Gross negligence, in the context of a claim for equitable relief from strict
compliance with the terms of an option, was perhaps best defined by the Texas Court
in Inn of the Hills, Ltd. v. Schulgen & Kiser. 723 S.W. 2d 299 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), a
case discussed in Appellant's Brief. Inn of Hills defined gross neglect as conduct by a
-13-

party that "reflects] conscious indifference of his right" or "the attitude of a person
who knew of his peril but demonstrated by his conduct that he did not care." 723
S.W.2d at 301. Since this Court has indicated, in Geisdorf, an intent to be guided by
Texas law in regard to this issue and the above definition is consistent with Utah law,
this definition should be persuasive.
Here, it is simply impossible to find that U. S. Realty's conduct reflected
"conscious indifference" of its rights or the attitude of a party who "knew of his peril
but demonstrated by his conduct that he did not care." U. S. Realty's agents made an
error due to a mistake in their Lease Abstracts. As soon as they discovered the error,
they sent the necessary written notice.

Obviously, there was neither "conscious

indifference" to U. S. Realty's rights, nor conduct demonstrating that U. S. Realty
"knew of its peril" but "did not care."
U. S. Realty thus contends that the undisputed record evidence supports a
finding of mistake, inadvertence or, at worst, mere negligence. Hoffman and Shiffman
testified that they relied on the Abstracts to manage the Leases for two basic reasons.
First, the Abstracts had been used for a number of years by prior management
companies to manage the K-Mart Center without any problems.

Indeed, the

undisputed evidence is, and the trial court found that, the omission of the Ground
Lease option renewal deadlines is the only error or omission that has occurred in the
Abstracts. Although the Lease Abstracts do not contain any information on the option
renewal requirements, Shiffman, whose job it was to notify Hoffman of those
-14-

requirements, was not alerted to this omission because he did not have any prior
experience administering Ground Leases. [R. 616 p. 172] The single ground lease
Shiffman had been previously responsible for related to a location in California where
the ground lease renewed automatically without notice. There is simply no evidence to
conclude that Shiffman showed an utter lack of care or knew his reliance on the
Abstracts would cause harm.

Rather, at worst the deadline was missed due to

Shiffman's inexperience with administering Ground Leases.
The second reason Hoffman and Shiffman relied on the Abstracts was because
it is a sensible approach to administering leases. Abstracts and tickler systems are used
to alert the managers of leases to significant deadlines and provide other pertinent
information in a summary format. It would be impractical to manage each lease on a
day-to-day basis by constantly referring to the lengthy lease itself. In order to find that
the standard of care applicable to property managers has been grossly or intentionally
breached by relying on Lease Abstracts under these circumstances, the trial court
necessarily would have had to rely on testimony from qualified experts as to the
appropriate standard of care. Defendants offered no such evidence and, instead, the
trial court merely substituted its own judgment as to what the standard should require.
Such an approach and the resultant conclusion of gross neglect are so clearly
inconsistent with the results in other similar cases that they simply cannot withstand
appropriate scrutiny by this Court.
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Finally, Mark Hoffman was not grossly negligent in relying upon Shiffman's
ability to alert him to the option renewal deadlines based upon the Lease Abstracts.
Hoffman testified that the letters he received from UDOT regarding the condemnation
did not cause him concern about the option renewal deadline because Shiffman and the
Lease Abstracts had always provided a reliable system for alerting him to other
deadlines. [R. 616 p. 123] The fact that Hoffman's reliance was mistaken in this
singular instance does not demonstrate conscience indifference or utter lack of care,
particularly where the failure to provide the notice was of no practical significance to
Defendants.
This Court should focus on the totality of the circumstances during the relevant
time period to evaluate the trial court's conclusion that Hoffman was grossly negligent.
The trial court found that the parties had engaged in extended negotiations regarding
the condemnation of certain portions of the K-Mart Center. The condemnation action
was the precise generator of the letters the trial court found should have alerted
Hoffman to specifically investigate the option renewal requirements. However, during
this entire condemnation process, which extended for more than two years, it is
undisputed that the parties exclusively pursued a resolution that would involve a rent
reduction for U. S. Realty, but only during the option periods. In fact, the trial court
found that between April 22, 1998, and July 15, 1998, the parties reached an agreement
that U. S. Realty would give up any rights to the condemnation proceeds in return for
Defendants agreeing to reduce the rents during the option periods.
-16-

[Memorandum

Decision, p. 5, par. 13] Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to perceive how
the requirement of a written notice became of secondary importance to all of the
parties because they had already reached an agreement that would provide U. S. Realty
with economic benefit only in the option periods. If the Leases were not going to be
renewed, this settlement agreement would be of no consequence at all, except
Defendants would have obtained U. S. Realty's interest in the condemnation proceeds
without any benefit to U. S. Realty.
Finally, Defendants' implication that U. S. Realty's notice was intentionally
delayed pending the arrival of K-Mart's notice to exercise its option is without merit.
The undisputed evidence clearly contradicts this suggestion. K-Mart did not provide
its notice to renew until May 18, 1998, almost a month after U. S. Realty provided its
notices to Defendants.

[Ex. P-14]

Thus, there is no evidence that U. S. Realty

intentionally delayed giving notice or that any advantage to U. S. Realty could be
gained by delaying its notice to wait on K-Mart.
In summary, the undisputed facts, evaluated under the entirety of circumstances
within an appropriate legal standard, do not justify a finding of gross negligence.
C.

GEISDORF AND BERETS DO NOT COMPEL THE DENIAL OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
TO U. S. REALTY UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, NOR DO THESE CASES
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.

Defendants contend that Geisdorf and Berets compel affirmation of the trial
court's denial of equitable relief to U. S. Realty. This argument is curious since the
trial court did not cite either case in support of its conclusion that U S. Realty's agents
-17-

were grossly negligent. In fact, Berets is not cited at all in the Court's Memorandum
Decision, and both Geisdorf and Berets are clearly distinguishable.
Neither Geisdorf nor Berets involve a ruling by the trial court that the tenant
failed to give timely notice due to gross neglect and should, therefore, be denied
equitable relief, the precise conclusion challenged in this case.

Geisdorf is also

inapplicable because the unsuccessful tenant in that case argued that the doctrine of
substantial compliance, not equitable relief, was the controlling legal theory. Indeed,
there is no indication that the tenant in Geisdorf made any mistake at all; the tenant
simply did not give written notice for reasons he apparently chose not to explain.
Defendants' assertion that Geisdorf demonstrates a contemporary judicial
attitude unfavorable to the equitable relief U. S. Realty seeks is also without merit. As
pointed out by the trial court, the doctrine of equitable relief explains or perhaps even
justifies the application of the strict construction rule in a manner that provides
flexibility to preclude inequitable results. [Memorandum Decision, p. 7] The recent
trend in other jurisdictions is to focus on the economic impact to the tenant from losing
its leasehold interest due to the delay in providing a required notice.

[Brief of

Appellant, pp. 29-35] Of course, the damage to the landlord, if any, from the delay in
receiving the notice must be balanced against the tenant's potential economic loss.
Under this standard, it is difficult to perceive a more compelling case for equitable
relief than the present case. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 25-26]
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The undisputed facts of this case are certainly more compelling with respect to
equitable relief than those in Geisdorf. The unsuccessful tenant in Geisdorf had only a
three-year lease containing two options to renew for additional five-year periods. The
lease in question was also not a ground lease pursuant to which the tenant had
constructed significant improvements at its own expense, but rather involved the lease
of improved premises owned entirely by the landlord. 972 P.2d at 68-69. In contrast,
U. S. Realty has 25-year Ground Leases with Defendants, containing six five-year
renewal options. U. S. Realty and its assignors constructed and maintained large,
presently-occupied commercial buildings at great cost and expense to U. S. Realty and
at no cost to Defendants. Further, unlike the tenant in Geisdorf, who can simply move
his business to a new location, U. S. Realty's business, that being its financial
relationships with its subtenants, is not so easily transportable, and would be forfeited
to Defendants in its entirety.
To deny equitable relief under these circumstances is to deprive U. S. Realty of
at least $1,300,000 in reasonable economic benefits anticipated during the option
terms, and to simply hand over to Defendants the keys to U. S. Realty's business
without any compensation whatsoever.

The trial court awarded this significant

windfall to Defendants based solely on U. S. Realty's delay in providing a notice
which was admittedly of no practical significance at all.

This is precisely the

unconscionable result the doctrine of equitable relief is intended to preclude, and not a
single case is cited by either the trial court or defendants that justifies this result.
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D.

U. S. REALTY'S EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC LOSS IS RELEVANT,
ADMITTED AND IS NOT SPECULATIVE.

WAS

Defendants purport to raise two challenges to U. S. Realty's evidence of
economic loss resulting from the termination of its leasehold interests in the K-Mart
Center.

First, Defendants argue that U. S. Realty could somehow reap an unfair

economic advantage by subsequently selling its interest in the K-Mart Center. [Brief
of Appellees, pp. 26-27] This argument is nothing more than speculation, is not based
upon any record evidence and was not raised below. The argument is simply without
merit and should be disregarded.
The second argument Defendants raise is that the testimony of William
Christensen, the certified real estate appraiser called by U. S. Realty, is speculative.
This argument is also without merit. The testimony of Mr. Christiansen was admitted
and was not objected to by Defendants' counsel as being speculative.

Both Mr.

Christiansen and Dr. Cris Lewis, an economist, testified that U. S. Realty's economic
loss, if equitable relief is not granted, is between $1,300,000 and $1,700,000. [Brief of
Appellant, p. 13] This evidence is undisputed, and the significant extent of U. S.
Realty's economic loss if equitable relief is denied is beyond legitimate challenge.
E.

U. S. REALTY HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE.

Defendants apparently miscomprehend the marshaling requirement of Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9). As required by this procedure, U. S. Realty has assembled and

1

Defendants' only objection was to relevance, but the Court allowed the testimony and did not
sustain this objection.
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provided citations to all of the record evidence supporting the trial court's findings,
even though Defendants' concede that the trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's
agents were grossly negligent is reviewed for correctness. Defendants have failed to
cite any evidence that was omitted by U. S. Realty, but rather argue that U. S. Realty's
position that the marshaled evidence does not support the conclusion of the trial court
somehow violates the marshaling requirement. It is the conclusions drawn from those
facts that are at the heart of this appeal, not any specific finding of fact.
Ill
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts establish that U. S. Realty is entitled to reversal of the trial
court's Judgment based on theories of implied waiver and equitable relief The trial
court applied an erroneous legal standard in rejecting implied waiver based upon
Defendants' claim that they did not have actual knowledge of their contractual right to
receive a notice of renewal from U. S. Realty, and because Defendants' waiver of this
right did not cause U. S. Realty to fail to provide timely notice. The undisputed facts
demonstrate that Defendants impliedly waived their right to receive timely notice due
primarily to their agreement that U. S. Realty would receive a reduction in rent in the
option periods in exchange for U. S. Realty's waiver of any right to the condemnation
proceeds, and by demanding and accepting payment by U. S. Realty for expenses
relating to the K-Mart Center for the option periods.

These facts, coupled with

Defendants' admitted indifference to the notices actually received, demonstrate, under
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the totality of circumstances, a distinct intent by Defendants to waive their contractual
right to receive a timely notice from U. S. Realty.
The trial court also erred in concluding that U. S. Realty was not entitled to
equitable relief. The evidence demonstrates that the failure to provide timely notice
was not due to any willful misconduct or utter lack of care by U. S. Realty's agents,
but, rather, was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake or, at worst, mere
negligence. The remaining elements of equitable relief are clearly present and cannot
be legitimately disputed. U. S. Realty's delay in providing notice was slight, and the
delay in providing notice to a lessor was of no consequence.

Finally, to refuse

equitable relief would result in the unconscionable loss of U. S. Realty's significant
leasehold interest, giving an entirely unearned windfall to Defendants.
As a result of the foregoing, U. S. Realty respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's Judgment and enter an Order granting U. S. Realty the
equitable relief it seeks in the form of a declaratory judgment excusing its failure to
provide timely notice and declaring that Defendants have impliedly waived any right to
receive such notice.
DATED this

day of November, 2000.

YOUNG, ADAMS & HOFFMAN, LLP

JeremyM .H(piffmm
b6tyvciky/ox Plaintiff/Appellant
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